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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§12101 et seq., 1 (ADA) protects the civil rights of disabled indi-
viduals by making it unlawful to "discriminate against a quali-
fied individual with a disability because of the disability... in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."2
Specifically, Title I of the ADA requires an employer to provide
"reasonable accommodations" 3 for a "qualified individual's" 4 im-
pairments or limitations unless doing so would cause an "undue
t The author received her J.D. from Pace University School of Law in 2005.
1 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213
(2003).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
3 § 12111(9). Examples of reasonable accommodations may include".. mak-
ing existing facilities accessible to and usable by disabled individuals . . . or re-
structuring job parameters.
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hardship" on the employer. 5 A major impetus to this legislation
was Congress' discovery that disabled workers face numerous
employment barriers, which cost the United States billions of
dollars in avoidable expenses resulting from non-productivity
and dependency. 6
These fiscal consequences can have international implica-
tions. With the increasingly global nature of business and the
need for American corporations to employ both American and
foreign labor, multinational corporations are greatly impacted
by the way they choose to treat their employees. 7 Of the many
factors affecting a decision to accept employment, the assurance
that civil rights will be protected can be a leading consideration.
This concern may be especially powerful in light of an overseas
position, where the employee is separated from the familiarity
and ordinary legal protections of his or her country's laws.
Therefore, in order to maximize overseas potential, American
corporations operating abroad must be cognizant of whether
federal anti-discrimination laws apply to their employees,8 both
those that are United States citizens and those that are not.
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of The Civil Rights
Act of 1964,9 and in turn amended the ADA and Title VII by
allowing extraterritorial application to American workers em-
ployed by U.S. or U.S.-controlled employers overseas: "With re-
spect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an
individual who is a citizen of the United States."10 However,
4 § 12111(8). A "qualified individual with a disability" is a disabled person
who, either with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the basic
requirements of the position he or she holds or desires.
5 § 12111(10). Several factors, outside of the scope of this casenote, are con-
sidered when determining whether the reasonable accommodation imposes a "sig-
nificant difficulty or expense" on the employer.
6 See § 12101(a)(9).
7 See Melody M. Kubo, Extraterritorial Application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 2 ASIAN-PAcIFIc L. & POL'Y J. 259 (2001) [hereinafter Kubo]
("With the increasing globalization of business activities, the expansive reach of
the ADA and related federal anti-discrimination statutes could potentially have a
significant impact on employment-related costs, operations, and profitability.").
8 See id.
9 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(4), 12112(c) (ADA) and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c) (Title VII).
10 See § 12111(4) (ADA) and § 2000e-1(c) (Title VII). The 1991 amendments
apply to ADA Title I employment discrimination claims, but not expressly to ADA
Title III. See Arlene S. Kanter, Symposium: Development in Disability Rights: The
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality as Applied to Disability Discrimination
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despite language in the ADA specifying U.S. citizenship as a
requirement for applicability, what remains unclear today is
whether protection extends to American workers who are actu-
ally foreign nationals, rather than US citizens."
In Torrico v. International Business Machines Corpora-
tion,12 an individual employed by IBM on a temporary assign-
ment in Chile was terminated while on medical leave and
subsequently sued IBM pursuant to the ADA.13 The court con-
cluded he stated a valid ADA claim notwithstanding his lack of
U.S. citizenship, 14 and despite the ADA's statutory definition of
"employee" as "an individual who is a citizen of the United
States."15 The issue in Torrico was whether the extraterritorial
provision of the ADA allowed this foreign national to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to the
ADA.16 The court held that the issue of extraterritoriality was
actually not implicated because Torrico's overseas assignment
constituted "employment in the United States" under the
court's "center of gravity test," thus bringing his discrimination
allegations within the domestic, rather than extraterritorial,
reach of the ADA.17 Ultimately, IBM prevailed.' 8 It is yet to be
determined whether the court's fact-oriented approach in locat-
ing the "center of gravity" of the employment relationship in or-
der to determine whether an employee comes within the
domestic or extraterritorial scope of the ADA might open the
Laws: Where Does It Leave Students with Disabilities Studying Abroad?, 14 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 291, 300 (2003) [hereinafter Kanter].
11 See Kubo, supra note 7, at 276; Kanter, supra note 10, at 291 ("But the
extent to which the ADA, or its predecessor the Rehabilitation Act, applies extra-
territorially to conduct and Americans overseas remains unresolved."). An exam-
ple of such an American employee is a foreign professional hired by an American
corporation who lives in the U.S. without U.S. citizenship, and is sent to work
abroad by his American employer.
12 Torrico v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
13 Id. Torrico also brought an action under the New York Human Rights Law,
but that consideration is beyond the scope of this casenote.
14 Id. at 390.
15 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
16 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
17 Id. at 404.
18 Torrico v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 26142(S.D.N.Y. 2004). The focus of this note is not to analyze the ultimate outcome or
the appropriateness of victory by either side, but to discuss the court's decision to
permit Torrico to state a claim under the ADA, and its implications.
20051
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floodgates of litigation to foreign nationals in similar
predicaments.19
The purpose of this casenote is to examine whether the
court properly decided Torrico in light of guidance on the sub-
ject provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), 20 the ADA itself, as well as both supportive and
contradictory caselaw interpreting the ADA and comparable
legislation. Part II of this note will discuss the historical back-
ground leading up to extraterritorial application of the ADA as
well as the current state of the law. Part III will present Tor-
rico. Part IV will contain a critical analysis of the case against
the backdrop of precedent cases and the specific factual circum-
stances surrounding Jorge Torrico's employment situation. Part
V will conclude that while the court in Torrico may have acted
reasonably in allowing the plaintiff to state an ADA claim based
on the facts at hand, the court did not provide definitive gui-
dance to future courts faced with comparable circumstances.
II. HISTORY OF ADA's EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION AND
THE LAW TODAY
The historical background of the ADA's extraterritorial ap-
plication can be understood in the context of the legislative his-
tory of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.21 Title VII
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, and sex.22 Prior to 1991, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to employment
19 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 404, n.6. To support its conclusion that the
"center of gravity" standard will not unjustifiably expand the ADA's scope to for-
eign nationals, the court points to the unlikely chance that foreign litigants will
have "sufficient preexisting contacts with the employer or the United States to
warrant the conclusion that the center of gravity... is in the United States."
20 Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the EEOC with regard to
the ADA; the agency is supposed to resolve statutory ambiguities. See Enforcement
Guidance on Application of Title VII and ADA to American Firms Overseas and to
Foreign Firms in the United States, 2 Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n Compli-
ance Manual 605 (1993) [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance]; See also, Rebecca H.
White, The EEOC, The Courts, And Employment Discrimination Policy: Recogniz-
ing The Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51
(1995) (noting the important role of the EEOC in interpreting employment dis-
crimination policy) [hereinafter White].
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c).
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 2000e-3.
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abroad due to the "presumption against extraterritoriality."23
This principle, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Foley
Brothers Inc. v. Filardo,24 provided that "legislation of Con-
gress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."25 In de-
clining to apply a federal labor law to a U.S. citizen in Iran, the
court in Foley Brothers reasoned that an American regulation
did not apply to a contract for business in a foreign country" ...
[olver which the United States has no direct legislative con-
trol."26 Similarly, in the consolidated cases of Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
and Bourlesan v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),27 the
United States Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 did not apply extraterritorially to employ-
ment outside of the U.S., even if the subject employers were
American corporations discriminating against U.S. citizens
abroad.28
In Aramco, the plaintiff, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in
Lebanon, sued Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco),
whose principal place of business was Saudi Arabia and whose
subsidiary, Aramco Service Company (ASC), was licensed to do
business in Texas.29 Both companies were incorporated in Del-
aware.30 After being hired by ASC in Houston, the plaintiff re-
quested a transfer to Saudi Arabia to work for Aramco.31 Five
years later, the plaintiff was terminated and he subsequently
filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and instituted a
23 James E. Ward, Is That Your Final Answer? The Patchwork Jurisprudence
Surrounding The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715,
2002. This article contains an informative discussion on the so-called "presumption
against extraterritoriality" and highlights the historically inconsistent approaches
taken by lower courts when determining whether to apply U.S. statutes to foreign
activity.
24 336 U.S. 281 (1949), reh'g denied, Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 299 N.Y. 684
(1949).
25 Foley Bros., Inc. et al. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), reh'g denied,
Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 299 N.Y. 684 (1949).
28 Id. at 290-91.
27 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) [hereinafter
Aramcol.
28 See Aramco.
29 See id. at 247.
30 See id.
31 See id.
2005]
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federal suit under Title VII, alleging that he was harassed and
fired by respondents due to his race, religion, and national ori-
gin.32 Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs claim because Title VII did not govern U.S. citizens work-
ing abroad for American employers.33 The district court
granted summary judgment to defendants, dismissed the plain-
tiffs claim on this ground, and both the Circuit 34 and Supreme
Court affirmed.35
Similar to its approach in Foley Brothers, the Supreme
Court conducted a strict statutory interpretation of Title VII
and held that the petitioner failed to make an affirmative show-
ing that the statutory language of Title VII should be construed
to apply extraterritorially. 36 The Aramco Court did not agree
with the plaintiffs contention that Title VII's expansive lan-
guage with regard to covered employers 37 meant that Congress
intended for the statute to extend to employment discrimina-
tion "anywhere in the world."38 The Court also rejected his
claim that Title VII's "alien-exemption clause" implied that
Congress expected the statute to have extraterritorial reach.
39
This provision states that Title VII "shall not apply to an em-
ployer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
State."40 To the contrary, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens in their dissenting opinion agreed that Congress would
not have included this provision if it had not expected the stat-
ute to apply outside any state, and since "only discrimination
against aliens is exempted, employers remain accountable for
discrimination against United States citizens abroad."4
1
The Aramco Court also looked beyond its own interpreta-
tion and found no support for the plaintiffs perspective in case
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Bourlesan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988).
35 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247.
36 See id. at 250.
37 See id. at 251. The court here refers to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g), where Con-
gress defines "commerce" in Title VII as activity".., among the several states; or
between a State and any place outside thereof. ..
38 Id. at 251.
39 Id. at 253.
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
41 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 267.
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law, and concluded that "even statutes that contain broad lan-
guage in their definitions of 'commerce' that expressly refer to
'foreign commerce' do not apply abroad."42 Additionally, the
court refused to defer to the EEOC's insistence on extending Ti-
tle VII protections to US citizens abroad.43 Despite recognizing
this agency's authority to interpret Title VII, the court found
the EEOC's reasoning to be inconsistent with the statute's lan-
guage, and frowned upon the twenty-four year gap between Ti-
tle ViI's enactment and the EEOC's first insistence on
extraterritorial application. 44 Finally, the Court provided two
reasons for upholding the "presumption against extraterritori-
ality." First, doing so " [s]erves to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord."45 Second, unless Con-
gress expresses an affirmative intention otherwise, Congress is
presumed to be concerned " [p1rimarily ... with .. . domestic
conditions." 46
Today, both Title VII and the ADA extend extraterritorially
to U.S. citizens employed abroad by American corporations, but
it remains unclear whether foreign nationals in these same po-
sitions are afforded the same protections. In response to the de-
cision in Aramco, Congress added section 109 to the Civil Rights
Act in 1991, and thereby amended both Title VII and the ADA
to apply extraterritorially to U.S. citizens abroad.47 The EEOC,
in its Enforcement Guidance,48 explained that the purpose be-
hind section 109 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act was to respond to
the Aramco decision. 49 The applicable language, identical in
42 Id. at 251.
43 See id. at 256.
44 See id. at 257. "The Commission's early pronouncements on the issue sup-
ported the conclusion that the statute was limited to domestic application. While
the Commission later intimated that the statute applied abroad, this position was
not expressly reflected in its policy guidelines until some 24 years after the pas-
sage of the statute. The EEOC offers no basis in its experience for the change. The
EEOC's interpretation of the statute here thus has been neither contemporaneous
with its enactment nor consistent since the statute came into law."
45 Id. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-
ras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963).
46 Id. (citing Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 290-91).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(4), 12112(c) (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(c) (Title
VIi).
48 See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 20. See also, White, supra note 20.
49 Id.
20051
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both statutes, provides: "With respect to employment in a for-
eign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen
of the United States."5 °
The ADA thus protects three categories of U.S. citizens;
those that are employed by: (1) a U.S. or U.S.-controlled corpo-
ration, anywhere in the world; (2) a foreign corporation con-
trolled by a U.S. multinational corporation at a location abroad;
and (3) a U.S.-based subsidiary company of a foreign multina-
tional corporation at a location in the United States.51 Moreo-
ver, Congress addressed the potential of international conflict
by excusing compliance with the Act if such " [would cause
such covered entity to violate the law of the foreign country in
which such workplace is located."52
Construed in light of EEOC guidance, the ADA seems to
cover U.S. citizens working abroad for U.S. employers, but not
non-U.S. citizens working abroad for those same employers.
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance5 3 on Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (Interpretive Guidance) provides that use
of the term "Americans" in the title of the ADA does not limit
the Act to U.S. citizens. 54 Instead, in this document the EEOC
explains that the ADA covers all qualified individuals, "regard-
less of their citizenship status or nationality."55 Yet what also
remains ambiguous is whether this indiscriminate policy ap-
plies to employment situations both within and outside the U.S.
In 1993, the EEOC issued its Enforcement Guidance exploring
the extraterritoriality issue. 56 Here, the ADA elaborated on
whether the 1991 amendments preserved Title VII's alien-ex-
emption provision:
Section 109 preserves the exemption in section 702 of Title VII for
'employers with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
State.' As a result, foreign nationals working abroad are not pro-
tected under Title VII whether they work for American or foreign
employers. Title VII does generally cover aliens working inside
the United States. Although the ADA does not contain an explicit
50 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-f (Title VII).
51 See Kubo, supra note 7, at 262-63.
52 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(1).
53 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) Appendix
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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exemption for aliens abroad, it is the Commission's position,
based on the language of the new section 101(4) covering U.S. citi-
zens overseas, that the standards governing coverage of aliens are
the same under both the ADA and Title VII.5 7
Based on the above text, the EEOC seems to be indicating
that foreign nationals who are not working "inside the United
States" are not protected by the ADA, since Title VII does not
offer this protection.58 The EEOC subsequently issued another
directive on this matter in 2000, addressing what it termed
"threshold issues" in federal anti-discrimination laws.59 Section
2-III ("Covered Parties") of this Compliance Manual states: "in-
dividuals who are employed in the United States are protected
by the EEO statutes regardless of their citizenship or immigra-
tion status. The EEO statutes do not protect non-citizens
outside the United States."60 Therefore, the EEOC interpreta-
tions, taken together, seem to indicate that whether the ADA
protects a foreign national will turn on whether or not he is em-
ployed in the U.S. at the time of the alleged disability
discrimination. 61
However, the disposition of an ADA discrimination claim
may not necessarily turn upon the employee's location. Al-
though Congress has authorized the EEOC to shed light on
ADA uncertainties, a lawsuit's disposition is ultimately up to
the courts and the statute itself, rather than an administrative
agency such as the EEOC because courts are not bound to fol-
low the agency's interpretations. 62 In fact, since the EEOC
lacks the authority to declare a party liable under the Act,
57 Id. at n.2 (emphasis in original).
58 Id.
59 Threshold Issues, 2 Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n Compliance Manual
§ 2-III (A)(4) (July 27, 2000). See also Kubo, supra note 7, at 265 n.35.
60 Threshold Issues, supra note 59.
61 See Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
62 See Wm. Scott Smith, Extraterritorial Application of Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Have Statute, Will Travel, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 191,
223 (1995) [hereinafter Smith] ("Although the EEOC has provided its interpreta-
tion of Congress' intent of the extraterritorial application of United States employ-
ment discrimination laws, courts are not bound to strictly follow it."). See also,
White, supra note 19, at 56: "I easily conclude the EEOC has been delegated law-
interpreting power under both the ADEA and the ADA." For a precise explanation
of the authority granted to the EEOC by Congress, see EEOC, Legislative History
of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 2029 (1968).
2005]
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[t]he judiciary's role in the enforcement process, therefore, gives
it undeniable policymaking power.. ."63 This is the case despite
the agency's power to administer claims, and its expansive
knowledge of the field.64 Further, the ADA itself confirms that
the source country of allegedly discriminatory acts is not dispos-
itive for extraterritorial application. 65 Instead, the determina-
tive issue is whether the employee makes a claim based on
employment in a foreign country.66 Therefore, courts prior to
Torrico have both advocated for and against the application of
Title VII and other comparable federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes67 to foreign nationals based on location of alleged discrimi-
nation as well as country of employment.
Yet before a court can decide in favor of or against a foreign
national plaintiffs request for federal legal protection, the court
must decide three foundational issues: first whether the defen-
dant corporation is a covered "employer" within the meaning of
the ADA.68 Second, whether extraterritoriality is an issue at
hand, and third, where an extraterritorial situation does exist,
the court must ascertain whether the facts justify a denial of
ADA or Title VII protection.
A corporation is an "employer" subject to the ADA and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act if it employs "15 or more employees
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
" . .,,69 This statutory requirement is an especially determina-
tive factor for ADA liability in the case of multinational compa-
nies, which employ individuals both in America and abroad.
Unfortunately, courts have not been consistent on whether
63 White, supra note 20, at 91.
64 See id.
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4): "With respect to employment in a foreign country
[emphasis added]..
66 See id.
67 See Kubo, supra note 7, at 275. After the 1991 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act, the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq.,) became similar in their extraterritorial provisions.
Consequently, it is logical to analyze the ADA in the context of comparable Title
VII provisions.
68 Id. at 289.
69 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(a) (Title VII).
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these corporations may exclude their foreign national employ-
ees from this calculation. 70
Regarding whether an extraterritoriality problem exists,
the court in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Bermuda Star Line, Inc. 71 held that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of Title VII was not implicated
where the employer made employment decisions within the
U.S. concerning positions located abroad.72 Therefore, the court
considered the defendant corporation to be within the ambit of
Title VII despite the international nature of this cruise line's
business, and notwithstanding its having been registered pur-
suant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, rather than American
law. 73 The court reasoned that Title VII application was proper
because the corporation had principal offices in the U.S. and ob-
tained most of its income from U.S. citizens, making the U.S. its
"base of operations."74 Moreover, in that case the injured plain-
tiff who was denied employment on the basis of gender was also
a U.S. citizen,75 thus bringing the case directly within the realm
of federal anti-discrimination law even though she never actu-
ally worked within the U.S. The Bermuda Star Line court thus
indicated that international business activity does not automat-
ically result in an extraterritoriality problem, and a substantial
connection (i.e., "defendant has stipulated that substantially all
of its advertising, during the time relevant to this case, was di-
rected to residents of the United States, and that substantially
all of the travel agencies which referred clients to the defendant
were located in the United States... [tihe defendant also pur-
chased substantially all necessary goods and services from
70 See Kubo, supra note 7, at 276-277; Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2d
Cir. 1998) (court counted a corporation's overseas employees toward the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act's 20-employee requirement); Greenbaum v.
Handelsbanken, N.Y., 26 F. Supp. 2d 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (foreign employees
counted toward statutory calculation for Title VII liability). Compare Robins v.
Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 460, amending 914 F. Supp. 1006, 1009-1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (where U.S. branch of a foreign multinational company employed
fewer than 15 employees, neither the parent nor subsidiary were liable under the
ADA; abrogated by the Second Circuit in Morelli).
71 744 F. Supp. 1109 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
72 EEOC v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1109 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
73 Id. at 1110.
74 Id. at 1113.
75 Id. at 1112.
2005]
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United States businesses") to the U.S. by defendant and plain-
tiff may justify application of Title VII despite these factors.76
Considering the importance attached to a corporation's sub-
stantial connection to the U.S., the scope of this definition is
critical. In Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc.,7 7 the court may
have implied a broad definition by allowing a plaintiff to state a
claim under the ADA against a foreign-flag cruise ship which
utilized U.S. waters. By following Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc., v. Massey,78 the Stevens court reasoned, "a foreign-flag
ship sailing in United States waters is not extraterritorial."
79
Although the issue of whether using U.S. waterways constitutes
a strong enough connection to the U.S. to warrant ADA applica-
tion may be arguable, the Stevens court found that Congress in-
tended to give the ADA a broad reach.80 Therefore, by applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality only to " [c]onduct
beyond U.S. borders,"8 ' the Stevens outcome may have set the
stage for the Torrico court to refuse to find an extraterritoriality
problem under the facts in that case, in which the plaintiff in-
sisted that relevant conduct occurred in the United States,
rather than abroad.
The third inquiry courts must address is to ascertain
whether the facts justify a denial of ADA or Title VII protection
where an extraterritorial situation does exist. Courts preceding
Torrico that have detected extraterritoriality difficulties have
generally refused to extend Title VII and ADA protection to
76 Id. at 1110. See also Smith, supra note 62, at 221 ("Application of Title VII
and the ADA to a United States worker employed overseas is appropriate when the
discriminatory decision is made in the United States as opposed to the foreign
country. In this situation, the discrimination takes place in the United States, not
the foreign country, and issues of sovereignty are of lesser consequence.").
77 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000).
78 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (activity is not extraterritorial if it occurs
within U.S. borders).
79 Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000).
80 Id. at 1242-43 ("In addition, Congress made no distinction between domes-
tic cruise ships and foreign-flag cruise ships in the statute... [tihe idea that Con-
gress intended to apply Title III to only domestic cruise ships, in the light of the
breadth of the ADA, seems strange.").
81 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. For a discussion of the "significant effects" excep-
tion to the presumption against extraterritoriality, see Kanter, supra note 10, at
298 ("Therefore, even where the significant effects of the regulated conduct are felt
outside U.S. borders, the statute itself does not present a problem of extraterritori-
ality, so long as the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within
the United States.").
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non-citizen plaintiffs suing over non-U.S. employment. For ex-
ample, in Russell v. Midwest-Werner & Pfleiderer, Inc.,8 2 the
court held that only American citizens counted for the purposes
of Title VII application in cases of foreign employment.8 3 In
Russell, the plaintiff named Werner & Pfleiderer's (an Ameri-
can company) foreign parent (Gummitechnik) as respondent in
her Title VII suit, but the court refused to count the foreign par-
ent's employees toward the statutory damage cap for Title VII
because those employees would not be afforded the protections
of this statute.8 4
Similarly, the court in Ghandour v. American University of
Beirut8 5 declined to extend Title VII protection to a non-citizen
cardiac surgeon licensed to practice medicine in the U.S.86 The
plaintiff, a Lebanese citizen, sued defendant, claiming that he
was wrongfully terminated from his position in Beirut because
of his religion after being employed by the university from 1985
- 1996.87 The court dismissed his Title VII claim, citing lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim of a non-citizen's em-
ployment in a foreign country.88 That court did not address the
presence or absence of a substantial connection between plain-
tiff and the U.S., despite his U.S. medical license. Likewise, the
court in Mithani v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Company89 dismissed,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff's complaint
because he based his allegations on employment in the London
office, and because he was an English, rather than American
citizen. 90 The court reasoned that because foreign employment
was involved, the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VII
due to his lack of U.S. citizenship. 91 Moreover, the court subse-
quently dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint, in which
82 955 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D. Kan. 1997).
83 Russell v. Midwest-Werner & Pfleiderer, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 114, 115 (D.
Kan. 1997).
84 Id.
85 Ghandour v. American Univ. of Beirut, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19154
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
86 Id. at *1-2.
87 Id. at *2.
88 Id. at *4.
89 Mithani v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19101 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
90 Id.
91 Id. at *3.
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he persisted that the Southern District of New York was proper
venue by claiming that had his employment with respondent
continued, he would have proceeded to work in respondent's
New York office by that point.92 Therefore, that court also did
not address the existence or non-existence of the plaintiffs po-
tential connection to the U.S., possibly because this claimed
connection was merely speculative.
III. PRESENTATION OF CASE
In Torrico, Jorge Torrico, a citizen of Chile, was employed
by respondent IBM, a New York corporation with its principal
place of business in Armonk, New York, from 1994 until 2000 in
the United States in its Latin American division.9 3 Although
the position was based in the U.S., it required travel between
New York and Latin America.9 4 To reduce his travel time, Tor-
rico requested and was granted a three-year temporary rota-
tional assignment in IBM Chile - at which time IBM contends
he became an employee of IBM's subsidiary.9 5 Torrico, in con-
trast, cited several ties to the U.S. in order to prove that he re-
mained a U.S. employee of the New York-based Latin American
division. These factors included the fact that he continued to
receive compensation from the IBM US payroll, continued to be
covered under U.S. benefit plans, and continued to pay both fed-
eral and New York taxes.9 6 Further, in an agreement letter de-
tailing the assignment, IBM represented to Torrico that his
assignment was temporary and that he was expected to return
to his "home country" at its completion.97 To further support
his argument, Torrico indicated that even while in Chile, he re-
ported to IBM US and never actually had line reporting obliga-
tions to IBM Chile or any other foreign subsidiary of the US
Corporation.9 8 Additionally, IBM described Torrico as a U.S.
92 Id. at *5. "Title ViI's venue provisions do not create a Title VII claim for
non-United States citizens working outside of the United States."
93 See Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 394.
97 Id. at 393.
98 See id. at 394.
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employee in its correspondence to the Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service in 1995, after the assignment commenced. 99
During the third year of his overseas project, Torrico's as-
signment was extended for one year, but IBM thereafter or-
dered him to quickly obtain another position within the
company because they planned to consolidate his division with
another.100 After beginning the interview process for this pur-
pose, Torrico became ill with an autoimmune disease and was
advised by physicians to abstain from work for a six-month pe-
riod. 10 1 Thereafter, Torrico took a medical leave of absence af-
ter which he was willing to return to work on a part-time
basis.10 2 Notwithstanding, IBM notified Torrico that his divi-
sion's upcoming reorganization meant he needed to expedite his
job search process or risk termination; 0 3 specifically, Torrico
was told to find a new position within six weeks.'0 4
Torrico was unable to find a new position by the deadline,
and a U.S. IBM manager thereafter discharged Torrico while he
was still on medical leave.'0 5 Subsequently, Torrico filed an
ADA claim, in which he alleged that the limited time provided
to him by IBM to locate a new position was discriminatory given
his illness and inability to return to full-time work.' 06 IBM
moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, arguing that Torrico was not covered by the ADA because
he was not a U.S. citizen, and because he was working in Chile,
rather than the U.S., when his employment was terminated. 0 7
Torrico presented two arguments in support of his claim
that he fell within the domestic scope of the ADA. First, Torrico
contended that his suit did not present an extraterritoriality
problem because the alleged acts of discrimination, being termi-
nated by a US IBM manager, occurred in the U.S.108 Second, he
posited that his Chilean assignment constituted employment in
99 See id.
100 See id. at 394-95.
101 See id. at 395.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 Torrico v. IBM, 319 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
105 See Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 399.
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the U.S., rather than "employment in a foreign country" under
the ADA, because his attachment to the U.S. did not dissi-
pate. 10 9 IBM argued that the locus of Torrico's employment
when he was terminated was Chile rather than the U.S.,
thereby excluding him from ADA protection. 110 IBM urged the
court to equate Torrico's predicament with those of plaintiffs in
several cases, discussed below, in which non-citizen employees
were denied protection of federal anti-discrimination laws be-
cause their employment locations were foreign countries.
In Iwata v. Stryker Corporation,1 the plaintiff was a Japa-
nese citizen employed by Matsumoto, the Japanese subsidiary
of Stryker, an American parent company. 112 The plaintiff had
been hired for the job when he was living in the U.S., but re-
turned to Japan to work. 113 After being discharged from his po-
sition, plaintiff returned to the U.S. as a resident alien and
instituted a suit against both corporations under Title VII."
14
The court dismissed plaintiffs claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, in that Title VII did not apply to non-citizens work-
ing outside of the U.S. The court found that plaintiffs Japanese
residence and locus of employment throughout his tenure made
him ineligible for Title VII coverage, especially since he never
became a U.S. citizen. 115
IBM also referred to Denty v. Smithkline Beecham Corpora-
tion116 to demonstrate the priority attached to the location of
the workplace over the location of plaintiffs employment at the
time of the alleged discrimination. In Denty, the plaintiff sued
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after
being denied several positions due to his age. 1 7 These promo-
tion decisions for jobs outside of the U.S. were made in England,
so the court held the ADEA's extraterritorial provision did not
109 Id.
110 See id. at 400.
111 59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Texas 1999).
112 See Iwata v. Stryker Corp. & Matsumoto Medical Instruments, Inc., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 600, 602 (N.D. Texas 1999).
113 See id.
114 See id. at 603. Plaintiff also filed an ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act) charge, which is beyond the scope of this casenote.
115 See id.
116 Denty v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1995), cert.
denied, Denty v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 522 U.S. 820 (1997).
117 Id.
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apply to his claims because that statute did not govern employ-
ment decisions made outside the U.S. for a foreign-run com-
pany. 118 The court rejected Denty's argument that his
complaint was domestic in nature just because he was working
in the U.S. for a U.S. employer at the time of the alleged dis-
crimination. 119 Instead, the court declared that the relevant lo-
cation determinative of extraterritoriality was the location of
the proposed positions.
Further, IBM clarified its position on the location of em-
ployment issue by pointing to Gantchar v. United Airlines,
Inc.,1 20 in which the court stated: "The primary focus must be
on the location of plaintiffs potential employment."' 2 ' In that
case, the court denied Title VII protection to foreign national
plaintiffs who based their complaints on work outside the
U.S.122 That court concluded that work for the London-based
positions applied for would primarily take place in international
air space, making the location of employment outside the U.S.,
even though the positions required twenty percent of work
within U.S. territory. 23 By analogizing Torrico's Chilean loca-
tion to the Iwata, Denty, and Gantchar plaintiffs' circum-
stances, IBM maintained that Torrico was not protected by the
ADA because he made allegations concerning employment
outside of the U.S.' 24
Despite IBM's arguments, the court declined to dismiss
Torrico's complaint.1 25 First of all, the court refused to analo-
gize Torrico's predicament to those of the plaintiffs in Iwata and
Denty.126 Unlike Torrico, who commenced employment with
IBM in the U.S. and thereafter maintained a significant connec-
tion to the U.S. during his temporary Chilean assignment by
reporting to a New York superior and receiving compensation
from the U.S. payroll, the Iwata and Denty plaintiffs never con-
118 See id. at 886.
119 See id.
120 Gantchar v. United Airlines, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3910 *21 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 35-36.
124 See Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
125 See id. at 400.
126 Id. at 401.
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templated employment within the U.S.127 Instead, they
grounded their federal discrimination claims entirely upon em-
ployment within a U.S. employer's foreign subsidiary. 128 Plain-
tiff Iwata's employment responsibilities required him to reside
in and complete work responsibilities entirely in Japan, with
the exception of a few business trips to the U.S.129 At no time
did the plaintiff in Iwata conduct prolonged work activities or
reside in the United States.1 30 Similarly, plaintiff Denty sued
for age discrimination based on positions denied to him which
were based outside the U.S. 1 3 1 Unlike Torrico who was tempo-
rarily located abroad at the time of the discrimination, not only
were the positions sought by Denty located in England, but
these jobs were permanent in nature and would have required
of him a completely different set of job responsibilities from
those of his initial U.S. position.1 32 Therefore, the Torrico court
found that Denty's connection to the U.S. was significantly
weaker than that exhibited by Torrico, for the purposes of deter-
mining a center of gravity of employment.1 33
Second, although the court did not agree with Torrico that
merely being terminated by an American manager brought him
within domestic reach of the ADA, the court favored his second
argument that the Chile assignment constituted "employment
in the United States."' 34 Rather than mere location of allegedly
discriminatory acts, the court explained, the scope of ADA cov-
erage turns upon whether the employee asserts a claim based in
totality on U.S. employment or foreign employment.1 35 Thus,
the "center of gravity" of the entire employment relationship de-
cides the location of a plaintiffs employment. 36 The court
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Iwata, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
130 Id. at 604.
131 Denty, 907 F. Supp. at 881.
132 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
133 See id. at 402 ("None of these cases involve temporary, fixed-term assign-
ments from an existing, U.S.-based position like the Temporary Assignment at is-
sue in this case.").
134 Id. at 400.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 403.
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thereby concluded that a factual analysis was in order, and de-
nied IBM's motion to dismiss Torrico's complaint. 137
To precisely define its standard, the court presented sev-
eral factors for consideration as part of the "totality of circum-
stances" surrounding a plaintiffs relationship with the defend-
ant employer. 138 Subsequently, the court found the "center of
gravity" of Torrico's employment with IBM to be within the U.S.
for several reasons, 39 some of which included his status as a
US IBM employee at the time of termination, the purpose of his
Chilean assignment as a way to ease his New York travel du-
ties, IBM's expectation that Torrico would return to New York
after the assignment ended, his continued reporting relation-
ship to a U.S. superior, IBM's representation to U.S. tax and
immigration officials that Torrico remained a New York em-
ployee while in Chile, and the fact that his compensation and
benefits were continued to be paid by the New York office. l4 0
The court held that a reasonable jury, under these facts, could
find an extraterritorial application problem did not exist be-
cause the jury might believe that Torrico's Chilean assignment
constituted employment in the United States for the purposes of
ADA coverage.'14
After the trial court dismissed IBM's motion to dismiss and
discovery was completed, IBM moved for summary judgment
based on three contentions, 4 2 the third being that Torrico was
not an "employee" under the ADA and that the evidence previ-
ously held sufficient to bring Torrico within ADA protection
thus remained inadequate. 143 Torrico thereafter cross-moved
137 See id. at 405-6.
138 Id. at 403-04. These factors included, but were not limited to: if and where
an employment relationship existed at the time of the discrimination, intent of the
parties concerning employment location, as well as the plaintiffs actual work du-
ties, reporting relationships, locations of work, duration of employee's assignments
in various locations, parties' domiciles, and the place of the alleged discriminatory
conduct.
139 See id. at 404.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 The other two issues raised by IBM on its motion for summary judgment
are beyond the scope of this paper.
143 Torrico, 319 F. Supp. 2d 390, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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for partial summary judgment on liability, but the court denied
both motions. 144
IBM objected to the court's initial ruling for several rea-
sons. First, IBM contended that the court should not have em-
ployed the "center of gravity" approach to determine the
location of Torrico's employment. IBM argued that courts com-
monly adopt this approach in choice-of-law questions for breach
of contract cases whereas the case at hand involved a discrimi-
nation claim.145 In response, the court indicated that IBM mis-
interpreted the role of the "center of gravity test" since choice-
of-law was not a factor in the present case because neither party
claimed that anything but federal law applied.1 46 Instead, this
court explained that it had to employ a "center-of-gravity" test
because in its motion to dismiss, IBM had not cited any factu-
ally similar cases involving short-term overseas assignments
from a U.S.-based position.147 Therefore, as a matter of first
impression and to properly determine Torrico's place of employ-
ment, the court considered such factors as are normally consid-
ered for purposes of choice-of-law issues.148
IBM also attempted to further dispute the court's reliance
on the "center of gravity" test by citing Shekoyan v. Sibley Inter-
national Corporation,149 the facts of which IBM attempted to
liken to Torrico's situation. In Shekoyan, the court held the Re-
public of Georgia to be the plaintiffs locus of employment for
Title VII purposes, where the defendant employer hired and
trained a resident alien in the United States for employment in
Georgia. Contrary to IBM's assertion, Shekoyan is distinguisha-
ble from the present case'50 since Torrico was initially hired for
a job in the United States, where he did work for several
months.
Next, IBM urged the court to reconsider its reliance on the
"center of gravity" test in light of public policy and the impor-
tance of adopting predictable and uniform rules. However, the
court did not find IBM's perspective that the "center of gravity"
144 Id. at 390.
145 Id. at 404.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 405.
148 Id.
149 Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002).
150 See Torrico, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
[Vol. 17:131
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss1/6
CASENOTE
test subjected ". .the determination concerning an employee's
status to a non-exhaustive list of factors and the highly unpre-
dictable 'totality of the circumstances' evaluation" to be persua-
sive or relevant. 151 The court instead opined that it did not
have "license to redefine the meaning of 'employment in a for-
eign country' under the ADA based on its own appraisal of com-
peting policy goals."1 52 Consequently, the court held that it
could not conclude as a matter of law that the "center of gravity"
of Torrico's employment was in Chile rather than the United
States, and thus denied IBM's motion for summary
judgment.153
In his motion, Torrico argued that he established a prima
facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, entitling
him to summary judgment on liability.15 4 The court also denied
this motion, holding that a jury could potentially find for either
party on the present factual record. 55 Among the factual un-
certainties, the reasons for Torrico's termination remained am-
biguous. While Torrico alleged that IBM terminated his
employment for discriminatory reasons, IBM offered affidavits
from employees involved in the matter supporting the conten-
tion that it discharged Torrico simply because he failed to locate
new employment within the designated time period. 56 Thus,
faced with questionable facts, the court concluded that the evi-
dence sufficed to create an issue of fact regarding IBM's real
reason for terminating Torrico, precluding summary judgment
151 See id. at 405 n. 14.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 406-07. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c): "Summary judgment must be
granted where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." On a motion for summary
judgment the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party. Therefore, for the reasons stated in its denial of IBM's motion to dismiss,
the court could not conclusively determine that the locus of Torrico's employment
was not the United States. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Tor-
rico, this court reiterated that Torrico formed a relationship with a U.S. office of
IBM, Torrico worked in the U.S. for several months, the U.S. office treated Torrico
as an American employee regarding salary and benefits, withheld U.S. taxes from
his income, Torrico reported to U.S. supervisors throughout his Chilean assign-
ment, and perhaps most revealing, IBM represented in writing to the Department
of Justice that Torrico was a U.S.-based employee.
154 Torrico, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 409.
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on the merits of Torrico's claims. 157 Ultimately, this lawsuit
was resolved in IBM's favor after a bench trial. 158
IV. ANALYSIS
By allowing Torrico to state a claim under the ADA, the
court made two important implications; first regarding the doc-
trine of extraterritoriality, and second, concerning the right of
non-citizens to assert ADA rights. Although the court came to a
reasonable conclusion on the specific facts of Torrico's situation,
whether or not the case provides meaningful guiding precedent
for future plaintiffs in similar employment arrangements as
Torrico remains uncertain.
First, the court in Torrico took over where the Bermuda
Star Line159 and Stevens1 60 courts left off in further delineating
the scope of extraterritoriality, by implying that extraterritori-
ality is not implicated by foreign employment where substantial
connections to the U.S. exist. Initially, by conducting a "base of
operations" test, the Bermuda Star Line court analyzed the ex-
traterritoriality issue in a manner quite similar to the Torrico
court's "center of gravity" approach. 16 ' Although the Bermuda
Star Line plaintiff was a U.S. citizen, the court's methodology,
in finding significant contacts between defendant and the U.S.
and then applying Title VII,162 seemingly supports the Torrico
court's decision to do the same with regard to Torrico's ties to
the U.S. Likewise, the Stevens court found the defendant cruise
line to exhibit a significant enough connection to the U.S. to
warrant an extension of the ADA. That court determined that a
foreign-flag ship, by merely making use of U.S. waters, elimi-
157 Id.
158 Torrico v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 26142
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
159 See EEOC v. Bermuda Star Line, 744 F. Supp. 1109 (M.D. Fla. 1990) ("In
any case, the fact of defendant's incorporation in the Caymans, by itself, is not an
adequate basis to stifle the application of United States law in deference to the law
of the Caymans .... Accordingly the Court finds that Title VII does apply.").
160 See Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000)
("By definition, an extraterritorial application of a statute involves the regulation
of conduct beyond U.S. borders. Accordingly, a foreign-flag ship sailing in United
States waters is not extraterritorial.") (emphasis in original).
161 See Bermuda Star Line, 744 F. Supp. at 1113 ("It follows that defendant's
base of operations is the United States.").
162 See id. at 1112.
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nated an extraterritoriality problem. 163 Similarly, Torrico fol-
lowed the above analysis by holding that the locus of plaintiffs
employment, rather than the mere presence of international
factors such as foreign employment location or non-citizen sta-
tus, determines extraterritoriality. 164 Therefore, considering
how broadly Torrico's predecessors defined activity within the
U.S., Torrico's finding of domestic employment within an over-
seas assignment was not altogether surprising.1 65
Compared with Ghandour166 and Mithani,167 the Torrico
court's decision to extend plaintiff ADA protection was also logi-
cal considering the significant factual differences between Tor-
rico and these cases. Although these pre-Torrico courts held in
favor of their defendants, one can argue that Torrico's connec-
tions to the U.S. were stronger than those of these counterpart
plaintiffs, and thus justified the court's decision to deny IBM's
motion to dismiss. For instance, in Ghandour168 the court de-
nied Title VII protection to a non-citizen suing over employment
in Beirut. 69 Therefore, unlike Torrico who began his relation-
ship with IBM in its New York office, the plaintiff in Ghandour
was initially employed in Beirut,1 70 rather than the U.S. - mak-
ing Torrico's claim for federal protection seem more appropri-
ate. However, the issue of whether the plaintiff in Ghandour
had significant ties to the U.S. highlights the unreliable subjec-
tivity of Torrico's "center of gravity" test. By earning a U.S.
163 See Stevens, 215 F.3d at 1242.
164 See Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 403 ("It is the 'center of gravity' of the entire
employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant employer, rather
than one or more particular locations where employment duties may have been
performed, that answers the factual question of whether an individual is 'em-
ployed in a foreign country' or in the United States within the meaning of the
ADA.").
165 The potential impact of Stevens on ADA application was noticed by the le-
gal media. For a brief discussion, see Does Case Signal New Expansion of ADA
Title III? Disability Compliance Bulletin, July 28, 2000, vol. 18, No. 3. ("Gary Da-
vidson, the Miami attorney who defended Premier Cruises, believes that the deci-
sion in Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc. . . . could signal the beginning of a
campaign by the Department of Justice to expand publication of the ADA beyond
our borders.").
166 Ghandour, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19154, at *2.
167 Mithani, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19101.
168 Ghandour, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19154.
169 Id. at *2.
170 See id.
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medical license,171 the plaintiff in Ghandour established a
strong connection to the U.S., noteworthy enough to afford him
federal legal protection. Although not discussed in that case,
one can infer that Ghandour must have taken licensing exams
for which he had to study American rules in order to obtain an
American cardiac surgeon's license. Does achieving an Ameri-
can professional license, with its requisite pre-licensing exam
preparation constitute a locus of study "within the United
States?" While this may be an analytical stretch, it is not an
outrageous proposition - one court may find a locus of employ-
ment in the U.S. where another finds Beirut. While a basis on
which to argue that the Torrico court may have granted
Ghandour his requested relief may be missing, the inability of
the "center of gravity" approach to generate predictable legal
outcomes is a legitimate contention.
Torrico's insistence on ADA coverage may seem reasonable
when considered in comparison to the decision in Mithani.172
Unlike the plaintiff in Ghandour who possessed a U.S. medical
license, the plaintiff in Mithani did not have any extraneous
links to the U.S. In fact, the Mithani court refused to extend
Title VII to the plaintiff, a non-citizen, because he based his en-
tire Title VII claim on employment in London.173 Therefore,
since Torrico maintained employment within the U.S. and con-
sequently connections to the U.S., this case's strong contrast
with Mithani might make Torrico's argument for subject matter
jurisdiction a plausible one.
Beyond its method of analyzing extraterritoriality, the
court in Torrico also created another important implication.
The court inferred that non-citizens might be granted ADA pro-
tection in cases of foreign employment despite the ADA's ex-
plicit citizenship requirement, 74 and regardless of prevailing
EEOC statutory interpretations pointing to the same. 7 5 Ex-
cept for the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, 76 which seemed to
expand ADA coverage to non-citizens, the other EEOC publica-
tions state that U.S. citizenship is a criterion for ADA coverage
171 See id. at *1.
172 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19101.
173 See id. at *2.
174 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-f (Title VII).
175 See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 20.
176 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) Appendix.
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in cases of foreign employment. 177 Due to what thus appears to
be an ambiguity within existing statutory interpretation, U.S.
citizenship may be considered a debatable requirement. 17
Therefore, the Torrico court was left without clear precedent,
giving it the analytical freedom to use its holding on the lack of
an extraterritoriality problem to justify extending ADA protec-
tion to a foreign national.1 79
Notwithstanding what appears to have been reasonable
conclusions on extraterritoriality and citizenship in the case at
hand, the Torrico decision has failed to provide precedent to fu-
ture courts faced with non-citizens seeking ADA protection. In-
stead of attempting to address the citizenship issue head on, the
court instead shielded its decision from criticism by stating: "
..the center of gravity of an employment relationship must be
analyzed based on the totality of the circumstances." °8 0 How-
ever, the problem is that both the "totality of the circum-
stances," as well as the "center of gravity" approaches are
highly fact-oriented, l s ' and depend on individual fact patterns
rather than predictable legal rules. 8 2 Thus, rather than ad-
dress the citizenship issue directly, the court attempted to avoid
a deeper analysis of the citizenship issue by stating:
.. (t)he standard applied here certainly will not, as suggested by
IBM, expand the scope of the statute 'to cover millions of foreign
nationals who file an overseas application for U.S. employment'
and.., there is no reason to believe that most overseas applicants
177 See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 20; Threshold Issues, supra note 58.
178 See Smith, supra note 62, at 225 (".. .(C)ongress included little legislative
history upon which the EEOC could rely in formulating its policy on the extraterri-
torial application of Title VII and the ADA. In doing so, Congress left it up to the
EEOC to define critical aspects of the Act such as the definition of an 'American'
and 'American-controlled' employer ... ").
179 See id. at 223 ("Although the EEOC has provided its interpretation of Con-
gress's intent of the extraterritorial application of United States employment dis-
crimination laws, courts are not bound to strictly follow it.").
180 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
181 In fact, commentators have noted the predominance of fact-based ap-
proaches within extraterritorial analysis as a whole. See Eric A. Savage and Ken-
neth J. Rose, Americans Working Outside The Country Often Benefit From The
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Anti-Discrimination Laws, N.J. L. J., June 3,
2002, at 1 (" . .. EEOC Guidance No. 915.002 ... requires a court to decide the
issue of employer nationality on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration va-
rious factors . . .") (emphasis added).
182 See Torrico, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n. 14.
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for employment with U.S. employers - whether the position
sought is located in the United States or in another country - will
have sufficient preexisting contacts with the employer or the
United States to warrant the conclusion that the center of gravity
of that applicant's relationship with the employer is in the United
States.183
On the contrary, there may be reason to believe that future
foreign national plaintiffs will have strong connections to the
U.S., but there may also be reason to believe that they will not.
Either way, the potential of pre-existing contacts to the U.S. by
a foreign national who subsequently accepts a U.S.-based posi-
tion is not entirely out of the realm of possibility. For example,
the "center of gravity test" may not adequately resolve the case
of a future plaintiff, who, for instance, continues to report to a
U.S. superior during his overseas stint, but temporarily re-
ceives compensation from the American corporation's foreign of-
fice rather than his initial U.S. location, for the duration of his
foreign employment.
Alternatively, unlike in Torrico's case, the hypothetical
overseas assignment may not be meant to necessarily ease U.S.
work responsibilities, but instead may intend to supplement
them, and the "center of gravity test" may fall short of providing
meaningful guidance. Will these details suffice to exclude the
individual from ADA protection? These factual variations on
the Torrico scenario may generate considerable uncertainty for
a court equipped only with the Torrico decision on which to
ground its analysis. By advocating a case-by-case analysis of
the scope of an employment relationship18 4 and by entirely dis-
missing the possibility of strong preexisting contacts with the
U.S. by a foreign national plaintiff, 8 5 the court may have fos-
tered unpredictability with regard to the citizenship issue.
Moreover, this case may lead to expensive and time-consuming
litigation for companies like IBM, who will need to stand trial
on discrimination claims such as those alleged by Jorge Torrico.
183 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 404 n.6.
184 One of IBM's key criticisms in its motion for Summary Judgment was that
the court should have employed a broad, generalized rule more conducive to the
difficult task companies face in determining whether foreign national employees
are subject to U.S. laws.
185 See Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 404 n.6.
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On the whole, in declining to consider the policy problems
associated with employing what IBM dubbed an "unpredict-
able"18 6 totality of the circumstances evaluation, the court in its
second opinion avoided an important discussion regarding com-
peting policy goals. These issues, written off as irrelevant to the
case at hand, are indeed of importance; this case certainly high-
lights the conflict courts face between employing bright-line le-
gal rules in the interest of predictability, and the goal of de-
ciding discrimination cases on a fact-oriented, individual basis.
V. CONCLUSION
The presumption against extraterritoriality no longer dom-
inates caselaw in the area of employment discrimination.1 8 7
However, the Torrico court may not necessarily have had con-
sistent instruction to follow when deliberating over its factual
circumstances. Due to disparities within EEOC interpretations
of the ADA and noteworthy factual differences between Torrico
and its predecessors, the Torrico court did not abuse its discre-
tion when denying IBM's motion to dismiss 88 or when it denied
both cross-motions for summary judgment.18 9 The court logi-
cally followed in the footsteps of previous decisions regarding
the scope of extraterritoriality, and thus concluded that extra-
territoriality was not implicated on the given facts. 190 However,
the effect of this case on the state of the law as it stood prior to
its ruling is ambiguous. By limiting its holding to Torrico's pre-
dicament and stating little on the issue of U.S. citizenship, the
court in Torrico may have created a visible exception to the
ADA's statutory citizenship requirement for future cases where
the "center of gravity" points to the United States.
The effect of Torrico on the international workplace may
turn out to be quite powerful - whether or not future courts
faced with a "Torrico" plaintiff decide to grant ADA protec-
186 See Torrico, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n. 14.
187 See Kanter, supra note 10, at 318 (" . . . before and after the Supreme
Court's decision in Aramco, courts have applied federal statutes to conduct over-
seas, even in the absence of explicit congressional authorization.").
188 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
189 Torrico, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
190 Torrico, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n. 9: "Having concluded that the facts al-
leged in the complaint can support the conclusion that the center of gravity of Tor-
rico's employment remained in New York... "
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tion.191 If a court employs the "center of gravity" test and finds
the U.S. not to be the locus of employment, a denial of coverage
might create a rift between employees of a foreign office whose
only difference is their U.S. citizenship status. To illustrate,
two employees, working for a major U.S. corporation in an over-
seas office allege identical disability discrimination, but only
one, the U.S. citizen, receives ADA protection. First, this dispa-
rate outcome will likely send a disturbing message to the for-
eign national. Not only may such a disparity in employee
treatment lead to on-the-job conflict, 192 but also the foreign na-
tional may become disenchanted with the company and his/her
incentive to perform may diminish.
Second, this result may lead to confusion on the part of the
corporation attempting to prevent Torrico-type situations. Cor-
porations may feel the need to investigate the presence of preex-
isting ties to the U.S. before making offers of employment to
these applicants, in order to avoid hiring non-citizens deserving
of ADA protection. In addition to being time-consuming and
costly, such a practice will likely implicate discrimination is-
sues. Furthermore, a corporation might need to consider the
composition and nature of the foreign work environment to pre-
vent disabling incidents or potential for employee rifts.
On the other hand, while the social and business reasons
for granting identical anti-discrimination protection to work-
place colleagues are numerous, a U.S. corporation should not
necessarily be penalized merely because its foreign national
workers happen to have preexisting connections to the U.S. In
fact, a corporation has the right to specifically seek the best of
both worlds - to hire a foreign national who is comfortable with
the prospect of working abroad, and who will quickly acclimate
to the company's American corporate culture precisely because
191 See Kubo, supra note 7, at 289 ("Multinational corporations seeking to suc-
cessfully compete in this new workplace would do well to take notice of the poten-
tial impact of U.S. anti-discrimination laws may have on their workforce.").
192 For a comprehensive discussion on possible ramifications of the extraterri-
torial application of the ADA, see Smith, supra note 62, at 219 ("Even if a foreign
subsidiary of a United States company can implement plans to distinguish its
treatment of United States and non-United States citizens, it will have the effect of
creating considerable disharmony in the workplace. Nationals of the host country,
who are treated according to their local laws, may feel discriminated against due to
the preferential treatment the subsidiary confers to United States citizens.").
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of his/her preexisting ties to the U.S. Therefore, it is astound-
ing to consider the degree of effort (and resulting expense) asso-
ciated with such preemptive "research" which may be imposed
on corporations by the extraterritorial application of the ADA to
non-citizens. These concerns, while somewhat speculative, are
not entirely unrealistic, and may face a corporation and a court
grappling with facts similar to Torrico in the future.
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